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An Intelligent Threat Prevention Framework with
Heterogeneous Information
Wenjun Ma 1 and Weiru Liu 1
Abstract. Three issues usually are associated with threat prevention
intelligent surveillance systems. First, the fusion and interpretation
of large scale incomplete heterogeneous information; second, the de-
mand of effectively predicting suspects’ intention and ranking the
potential threats posed by each suspect; third, strategies of allocating
limited security resources (e.g., the dispatch of security team) to pre-
vent a suspect’s further actions towards critical assets. However, in
the literature, these three issues are seldomly considered together in a
sensor network based intelligent surveillance framework. To address
this problem, in this paper, we propose a multi-level decision sup-
port framework for in-time reaction in intelligent surveillance. More
speciﬁcally, based on a multi-criteria event modeling framework, we
design a method to predict the most plausible intention of a suspect.
Following this, a decision support model is proposed to rank each
suspect based on their threat severity and to determine resource al-
location strategies. Finally, formal properties are discussed to justify
our framework.
1 Introduction
The demand for intelligent surveillance systems is growing rapid-
ly due to the increased threats to the public and society. In order to
prevent threats, in many real-world applications, a security system
should not only predict the intentions of suspects and rank the po-
tential threats, but also allocate the security resources to prevent the
most plausible and dangerous threat. However, given that most of
current surveillance frameworks in this domain only focus on some
of the three related issues we mentioned in abstract, they are not well
suited to model and reason with heterogeneous information used in
a complex security surveillance situation.
In this paper, we develop a novel intelligent surveillance frame-
work coupling lower-level event detection from multiple sources
with high-level prediction and decision making. The lower-level is
to process heterogeneous sensor information to derive events with
rich semantic information such as critical characteristics of subjects
being monitored. The high-level is responsible for analyzing the in-
tentions of suspects, prioritizing threats posed by different suspects,
and selecting optimal strategies based on limited security resources.
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of our framework.
Our main contributions are as follows: (i) we propose a framework
that is able to fuse heterogeneous sensor information under uncer-
tainty, and make use of fusion results to support decisions; (ii) we
deﬁne a method to analyze the intention of a suspect, which consid-
ers the criteria weights, the priority for each state of each criterion,
and the uncertain information obtained by classiﬁcation algorithms;
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Figure 1. Multi-Levels Surveillance Framework Architecture
(iii) our framework can select optimal strategies for decision support
under limited security resources.
2 Suspect Intention Recognition
The lower-level of our surveillance system can be constructed by the
multi-criteria event modeling framework in [2] to represent events
from multiple sources with uncertain and incomplete information.
Following this, we consider the second key issue about how to dif-
ferentiate normal intentions from malevolent ones. To achieve this,
we associate malevolent intentions with the concept of suspect type
in security game framework [5]: such as Robber, Bomber, Gunman,
etc. That is, if a suspect is a Robber, his intention is to rob someone.
Such a suspect intention recognition problem can be addressed by
extending the method in [3] to include event inference as follows:
Step 1: Determine intentions (types) in frame Θ and related crite-
ria for a suspect based on the observed events.
Step 2: Create inference rules to correlate events for d-
ifferent behaviors, and dynamically generate the mass func-
tions over the frames for the rules of different behaviors
{satisﬁedR1, . . . , satisﬁedRn, satisﬁed NoRules} (where satisﬁed
R1 means only R1 (no other rules) is satisﬁed) based on events ob-
served under uncertainty (events that are part of rule conditions).
Step 3: Construct the preference matrix, mass function mc, utility
function uc and normalized weight (ωi/
∑
ωi) for each criterion.
Step 4: Determine the mass function mvic,t about the suspect’s
types for each criterion’s state by DS/AHP method [1].
Step 5: Obtain the set of mass functions {mc,t(x)} about a sus-
pect’s type for each criterion. And
mc,t(x)=
∑
vic∈Ωc
∑
V
⋂
vic =∅
u(vic)
∑{u(vjc) | vjc ∈V}
mc(V )mvic,t(x).
Step 6: Obtain the overall mass function mt(x) of suspect’s types
by combining mc,t for each criterion with Dempster’s combine rule.
Thus, mt(x) implies a suspect’s possible intention.
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Moreover, to avoid overloading a security system, some pre-
deﬁned thresholds are used to eliminate subjects that will not cause
security concerns, and concentrate only on highly suspicious ones.
The reason of setting these thresholds is that: the criteria with lower
weights or the criterion’s states with lower level of potential threats
always show that the person is normal in our method. Thus, a criteri-
on with a higher weight will be triggered to predict the suspect’s type,
if the mass values of some states with high potential threat levels are
greater than a required threshold. Hence, only the subjects with a
high-weight triggered criterion are remained for intention analysis.
3 Decision Support with Limited Resources
Decision support with limited resources requires information such as
the priority of suspects and the locations of resources dispatched.
First, we consider the priority of suspects. After detecting the sus-
pects’ intention and deﬁning the level of potential threat for each
possible intention ti ∈ Θ by a utility function u : Θ −→ R, where
R is the real number set, we can obtain the point-valued potential
threat degree w.r.t. each suspect and rank the priorities of the suspects
by the method in [2]. Moreover, assigning the available security re-
sources can be achieved by the following method: ﬁrst, determine the
maximum available security resources and the maximum required re-
sources for each suspect based on his potential attack targets. Second,
set the ordering of suspects based on their potential threat degrees.
Third, set a threshold value k to distinguish less severe threats from
signiﬁcant ones. Forth, eliminate the suspects whose potential threat
degrees are less than k. Fifth, assign the security resources one by
one according to the priorities of the remained suspects in the order
of threat levels (from high to low) until all the resources are allocated
or all suspects being assigned maximum required resources.
Also, suspects with different intentions might have different pref-
erences over the choices of their next moves. Thus, in order to ﬁnd
out the optimal strategy to dispatch security resources, the system
should consider the ambiguity of suspect’s type (intention), the avail-
able security resources, and the importance of a potential attack tar-
get for a given suspect. Here, since it is unrealistic to assume a sus-
pect knows a defender’s belief about his type (intention), a defender’s
selected strategy and the amounts of available resources in the real-
time surveillance environment, current solution concepts in securi-
ty games are not well-suited to model ambiguous threat prevention
games. Based on the minimax regret principle [4] and the decision
rule under ambiguity in [2], the whole process of ﬁnding the opti-
mal strategy of defender can be solved by a Mixed-Integer Quadrat-
ic Program as follows (where V = min
ql
max
ah
( max
bk∈A2
u2,t(ah, bl) −
∑n
j=1 u2,t(ah, bj)q
t
l ) is the value of minimax regret mixed strategy
of suspect type t):
max Σni=1Σ
n
j=1ΣA⊆Θ pi((1− δ(k))mt(A)min{u1,t(ai, bj)qtj |
t ∈ A}+ δ(k)mt(A)max{u1,t(ai, bj)qtj | t ∈ A})
s.t. Σni=1pi = m,Σ
n
j=1qj = 1
∀ah ∈ A2, max
bk∈A2
u2,t(ah, bk)− Σnj=1u2,t(ah, bj)qtj ≤ V
pi ∈ {0, 1}, qj ∈ [0, 1]
Here for the threat prevention security resources allocation strat-
egy of a defender (denoted by pi for the assignment of m security
resources to each pure strategy ai ∈ A1) and the possible attack tar-
get selection by each type of suspect (denote by qtj for the probabili-
ties assignment of suspect type t to each pure strategy bj ∈ A2), the
objective function represents the expected reward for the defender
considering the mass distribution mt(A) over the suspect types (in-
tentions) and the signiﬁcant degree δ(k) for the related events. The
ﬁrst part of the ﬁrst and the third constraints limit the strategies se-
lected by the defender being a pure distribution overA1 (that is, each
pi either exactly equal to one or exactly equal to zero). Note that we
need to consider only the reward-maximizing pure strategies of de-
fender, since for the given ﬁxed mixed strategies of all suspect types,
the defender faces a problem with ﬁxed linear rewards after applying
rule in [2]. If a mixed strategy is optimal for the defender, then so are
all the pure strategies in support of that mixed strategy. Moreover,
the second part of the ﬁrst and the third constraints deﬁne the set of
possible attack targets selection by a suspect of type t, where qtj is a
probability distribution over the set of actionsA2. Finally, the second
constraint ensures that each type of suspect will adopt the minimax
regret strategy as his optimal strategy.
4 Properties
In fact, our framework satisﬁes some desirable properties that an in-
telligent surveillance system should have.
Property 1: The possible intention of a suspect is determined by
the inference result of fusing all criteria information together.
Property 2: The higher weight a criterion has, the higher inﬂuence
it has on the result of suspect intention recognition, ceteris paribus.
And the higher preference ranking value is for a suspect’s type in a
state of a criterion, the more possible it becomes the most plausible
intention of the suspect, ceteris paribus.
Property 3: If by a classiﬁcation algorithm, a criterion is classi-
ﬁed as a state with a certainty p, then the higher value of p, the more
possible for the type with the highest preference ranking value in
this state becomes the most plausible intention of the suspect, ceteris
paribus. And the higher the level of potential threat for a given s-
tate vci is, the more possible for the type with the highest preference
ranking value in this state becomes the most plausible intention of
the suspect, ceteris paribus.
Property 4: For decision under ambiguity, if the worst condition
of a choice has a higher expect utility than the best condition of an-
other, we should choose the former; if the signiﬁcance degree of a
choice is not less than that of another, and the worst and best condi-
tions of this choice has a higher expect utility than those of another
respectively, we should choose this choice; and for two expect utility
intervals with the same center and one covers another, the signiﬁ-
cance degree will determine our choice.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes an intelligence surveillance framework to handle
three key issues in complex surveillance situations: event modeling,
suspect intention recognition (event inference), decision support with
limited security resources. First, we introduced a suspect’s intention
recognition method to predict the suspects’ plausible intentions. Af-
ter that, we proposed a mixed-integer quadratic program to determine
the defender’s optimal strategy. Furthermore, we stated some desir-
able properties of an intelligent surveillance system and proved that
our framework satisﬁes these properties.
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